A similar incident occurred in October 2023, when two undersea cables and a gas pipeline were damaged by the trailing anchor of a Chinese vessel. Despite initial denials of responsibility, Chinese authorities acknowledged 10 months later that Hong Kong-flagged ship NewNew Polar Bear caused the damage by accident.
Unfortunately, without perpetual surveillance, it is difficult to establish intentionality, or even attribution, in such incidents. And given the stakes involved, states are unlikely to risk escalation unless guilt can be proven beyond all reasonable doubt.
AN EMERGING VECTOR OF THREAT
Given the vastness of the Earth’s oceans, and the sheer number of undersea cables, securing the global network in its entirety is impossible. Furthermore, many cables run through international waters, where there is no effective regime to hold potential culprits accountable.
Undersea cables are vital to the functioning of the internet, and while it cannot be conclusively proven that the cable incidents in the Baltic Sea were malicious, they provide a glimpse of how similar acts of sabotage could be employed as part of a hybrid strategy.
For example, in 2023, two undersea cables connecting Taiwan with its Matsu islands were cut by Chinese non-naval vessels, disconnecting 14,000 people from the internet for 50 days. While there was no evidence that this was a deliberate act on China’s part, it is not hard to see how such an incident might support military operations in the event of war.
The Asia Pacific and its many cables is a fertile hunting ground for would-be hybrid actors. For example, the Straits of Malacca is a critical chokepoint for the region’s undersea cables, responsible for providing data connection between Asia, India, the Middle East and Europe, and with its relatively shallow waters, run a high risk of incidents. Should an incident occur there, the impact on regional connectivity would be significant.
Source: CNA
