Europe cannot yet afford to celebrate post-al-Assad Syria
By Shlomo Roiter Jesner, president, co-founder, Cambridge Middle East and North Africa Forum
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent in any way the editorial position of Euronews.
For Europe, the risks of inaction and complacency far outweigh any fleeting sense of relief at al-Assad’s demise, Shlomo Roiter Jesner writes.
The sudden, and for most, unexpected collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime has left Syria, already teetering from almost 13 years of civil war, at yet another crossroads, with implications for Europe that cannot be ignored.
Many in Europe have chosen to focus on the defeat, which this moment has proven to be for al-Assad’s backers in the “axis of resistance” — Russia and Iran — highlighting a long-awaited opportunity for progress.
EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Kaja Kallas described al-Assad’s downfall as “a positive and long-awaited development,” while European Parliament President Roberta Metsola highlighted that “what happens in the next hours and days matters”.
With such statements coming out of Brussels reflecting European optimism, reactions that are too focused on the immediate outcome risk overshadowing the significant dangers now confronting Syria, its neighbours and Europe.
Al-Jolani: Reformed or just rebranded again?
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which led the advance alongside additional Islamist factions, are currently moving to consolidate power, understanding that time is of the essence in establishing the facts on the ground that will define the rule of Syria for perhaps generations to come.
The spectre of yet another failed state in the region should, however, be top of everyone’s minds. Although HTS has actively sought to cautiously navigate away from its origins as an al-Qaeda affiliate, the faction under the leadership of Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, who has since shed his Islamist nom-de-guerre in favour of his birth name, Ahmed al-Sharaa, remains a proscribed terrorist group in much of the world, including Europe, although the UK government, in light of developments in Syria, announced a decision to reassess this status.
HTS’ and al-Jolani’s direct links to the so-called IS should not be forgotten, with al-Jolani founding the IS-affiliated al-Nusra Front on direct orders of the late IS arch-terrorist Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
Al-Jolani would later pledge allegiance to and, subsequently, sever ties with al-Qaeda, rebranding the group as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and later as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in 2017, all in an attempt to position HTS as a dominant and politically viable force in Syria.
Its ascent to power through both IS and al-Qaeda and its rebranding notwithstanding, the history of HTS should raise serious concerns in Europe regarding its capacity for governance, interest in protecting human rights, and appropriateness for providing Syria with much-needed domestic and broader regional stability.
Furthermore, although the fall of al-Assad has been depicted as the product of Syrian opposition, it is in actuality the product of a severely fractured opposition at best, composed of HTS in Damascus, Kurdish-led forces in the east and Turkish-backed factions in the north.
Suggesting that Syria might, for the foreseeable future, face a protracted period of internal strife would be an understatement.
To understand the risks, one need look no further than Syria’s neighbour to the West, Lebanon, where fragmentation has entrenched sectarian divisions and perpetuated dysfunction for over a decade.
For Europe, the prospect of a splintered Syria dominated by militant factions takes the risk a step further, with the potential for an Iraqi model of ungoverned spaces that could serve as havens for extremism being a very realistic one.
Enter Erdoğan
Recent actions by Jerusalem, where the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) immediately seized control of a demilitarised buffer zone in the Golan Heights, underscore the magnitude of the risks stemming from the ongoing Islamist takeover.
Following the collapse of the al-Assad regime, Netanyahu declared that the 1974 disengagement agreement with Syria had “collapsed,” leading the IDF to also reinforce the Israeli side of the territory while deploying its air force to pre-emptively strike strategic weapons stockpiles deep inside the neighbouring country.
Abu Mohammed al-Jolani’s familial roots in the Golan Heights further complicate matters, broadening the dangers posed by the still-developing power vacuum stemming from the militant factions now vying for control of Syria.
Strikes yesterday saw the IDF functionally decimating both the air force and Syria’s air defences, in their entirety, with such a drastic, pre-emptive strike not having taken place in the region since the 1967 Six-Day War.
Compounding the risks is Turkey’s expanding Islamist agenda under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, which has seen Ankara supporting HTS and providing the green light for the offensive, culminating in the fall of the al-Assad regime.
Although Erdoğan has refrained from supporting HTS or its radical agenda publicly, the offensive would have been impossible without Turkish military training, technical knowledge and logistical support.
Although Erdoğan’s government’s primary interest has been to target the Kurdish military stationed in an autonomous enclave in northern Syria just across the Turkish border, seeing Moscow and Tehran — its other primary strategic nemeses in the region — losing a foothold is certainly a welcome development.
And while reports have surfaced that Turkish actions have been coordinated with Israel, with whom it shares a mutual interest in ridding the region of Russian and Iranian assets, an empowered Erdoğan, who has increasingly worked to export his vision of political Islam abroad, is certainly not in Europe’s best interest.
Erdoğan’s rhetoric, which has included likening modern struggles against Western interest to historic battles against the “Crusader world”, highlights the ideological zeal driving his policies.
Although perhaps secretly coordinating with Israel at this particular inflexion point, Erdoğan’s past calls for an alliance of Islamic countries against perceived threats from Israel further underscores his agenda’s regional and international implications.
For Europe, this means grappling not just with the immediate fallout of Syria’s instability but also with the broader ripple effects of Erdoğan’s ideological expansion.
How to make this ray of hope last?
Despite reports of Syrians, who are returning to Syria in droves in the euphoria of the moment, any renewed wave of instability in the Middle Eastern country would certainly lead to another surge of refugees seeking safety on the shores of Europe.
That, coupled with an empowered Turkey that would likely, as it has in the past, leverage refugees as a bargaining chip in its own dealings with the European Union, would not be a welcome scenario in Brussels.
With a Trump administration expected to withdraw what remains of a US presence in Syria, particularly in the Kurdish autonomous region, Erdoğan would have a free hand to pursue his ambitions, including crushing Kurdish autonomy once and for all while entrenching, for the long-term, Turkish influence in northern Syria.
The much-welcomed fall of al-Assad does mark the end of a very brutal era, providing Syrians with a long-awaited ray of hope.
However, it should not be seen as the end of Syria’s troubles or even an automatic new beginning, although it is a chance at one.
For Europe, the risks of inaction and complacency far outweigh any fleeting sense of relief at al-Assad’s demise. The broader implications — from regional instability to ideological exportation — should make Syria’s future an immediate matter of concern.
Shlomo Roiter Jesner is the president and co-founder of the Cambridge Middle East and North Africa Forum. He is also the CEO of London-based F&R Strategy Group, a geopolitical consultancy at the intersection of politics and business.
Source: Euro News