The replacement of the two ministers, as well as former PLA Rocket Force commander Li Yuchao and political commissar Xu Zhongbo, means the careers of at least four among the 205 “full” members of the Central Committee hang in the balance.
The rare reshuffle in top diplomatic and military positions so soon after their appointments suggested serious wrongdoing – but Beijing did not explain the removals.
That intended vagueness – an obvious sign that Beijing has sought to buy time for what could be seen as major embarrassments – may not bode well in a plenum, when the leadership usually discloses progress on investigations into senior leaders.
A political researcher at Peking University who did not wish to be identified said the purges were likely to entail soul-searching in Beijing on the vetting processes for top cadres, often cited by the party as proof of the strength of its political system.
Xi is heavily involved in the vetting process, according to state news agency Xinhua, which said he has personally reviewed the list of all Central Committee members since the 19th party congress in 2017.
The reports also said Xi was briefed “many times” in the lead-up to both the 19th and the 20th party congresses to make sure the most “capable, loyal and clean cadres” were picked.
“But it seems that even with his personal attention, the process is not 100 per cent [corruption-proof]. He will definitely order the team in charge to reflect on what went wrong and find ways to … make it impeccable,” the researcher said.
The National People’s Congress (NPC) gives a window for Beijing to clean up these unresolved issues, including the possibility of appointing a new foreign minister to replace Wang Yi, whose abrupt replacement of Qin Gang last year was largely read as an indicator of a crisis mode in China’s diplomacy.
Equally, Beijing has not yet promoted Dong Jun, the defence minister who replaced Li Shangfu, to the full ranks. Dong has yet to become a state councillor and a member of the CMC. The coming NPC session is also an occasion for him to be handed both titles, on par with his predecessors, if the party chooses to do so.
Neil Thomas, a fellow for Chinese politics at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Centre for China Analysis, said that because Li Shangfu and Qin Gang were both state councillors, the expectation was that their replacements would also hold this higher-ranked position.
“If the new defence minister or foreign minister does not also become a state councillor, it will make them less powerful officials and suggest that Xi does not fully trust them,” he said. “But the rising unpredictability of personnel movements in Xi’s third term makes it difficult to know whether this change will occur at the two sessions.”
The Peking University political researcher said the appointment of a new foreign minister and promotion of a new foreign and defence minister to state councillor was “a good starting point because it would send a clear political signal that these new leaders have the party’s top leader’s trust and endorsement”.
“Diplomacy and defence are two critical systems for Beijing to manage the tensions with the United States and handle regional hotspots like the Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, and Korean peninsula. Their resumption to normal modes will mean foreign diplomats and military officials can interact with their Chinese counterparts according to established protocol,” the researcher said.
He added that a complete end to this round of purges in China’s diplomatic and defence corps could only come after the Central Committee’s meeting, because the final decisions on removal of their Central Committee membership and verdicts on the alleged disciplinary problems of the senior officials needed to be formally endorsed by the party’s top decision-making body.
Another key function of that third plenum is to set a midterm economic strategy, which, like the personnel purges, will also contribute to the overall direction for the coming two sessions, when Li Qiang will deliver the government work report.
But experts have also speculated about another reason for the delay of the plenum – that Beijing assessed that the causes of China’s economic difficulties are complex and require a nuanced approach – meaning the leadership needs more time to examine the facts and come up with a viable strategy.
Source: CNA
